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Does Ethnic Diversity Erode Trust? Putnam’s
‘Hunkering Down’ Thesis Reconsidered
PATRICK STURGIS*, IAN BRUNTON-SMITH, SANNA READ AND
NICK ALLUM
We use a multi-level modelling approach to estimate the effect of ethnic diversity on measures of
generalized and strategic trust using data from a new survey in Britain with a sample size approaching
25,000 individuals. In addition to the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods, we incorporate a range of
indicators of the socio-economic characteristics of individuals and the areas in which they live. Our
results show no effect of ethnic diversity on generalized trust. There is a statistically signiﬁcant
association between diversity and a measure of strategic trust, but in substantive terms, the effect is
trivial and dwarfed by the effects of economic deprivation and the social connectedness of individuals.
ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND TRUST
Much recent attention within the social capital literature has focused on the effect of cultural
and ethnic diversity on civic attitudes and behaviour. Drawing on psychological theories of
social identity and inter-group conﬂict,1 political commentators and academic scholars alike
have drawn quite pessimistic conclusions about the effects of ethnic diversity on community
cohesion and the provision of public goods.2 Perhaps most notable in this regard is Robert
Putnam’s recent account of the negative consequences of ethnic diversity on both inter-
ethnic and intra-ethnic trust in the United States. Drawing on wide-ranging analysis of the
Social Capital Community Benchmark (SCCB) survey, Putnam contends that ethnic
diversity causes people to ‘hunker down’, ‘to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their
neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin’.3
Others have come to similar conclusions, using independent data sources, alternative
geographies and different measures of both trust and ethnic diversity. And, while some of
the conclusions drawn from these analyses are rather more circumspect than Putnam’s,
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there appears to be a growing concern that ‘high levels of racial and ethnic heterogeneity
are accompanied by lower levels of trust and other civic attitudes’.4 And, as Putnam
points out, such conclusions are particularly worrying for policy makers, given the
historically high level of ethnic diversity in most Western democracies, a trend which is
likely to increase in the future.5
Yet, despite the prima facie plausibility of such concerns, there are several reasons to
pause before we accept the strong claim that neighbourhood ethnic diversity represents a
worrying corrosive inﬂuence on trust between citizens in multi-cultural societies. First, the
vast majority of extant empirical investigations are based on data collected in North
America and are hence of limited generality for addressing broad questions relating
to the effect of ethnic diversity on trust. Second, on closer inspection, the pattern of
ﬁndings in existing research is rather more nuanced and inconsistent than might, at ﬁrst
sight, appear to be the case. In particular, empirical scholars have paid insufﬁcient
attention to distinctions drawn in theoretical accounts between different kinds of inter-
personal trust and how these should be measured empirically. Finally, existing studies
have placed greater emphasis on the statistical than on the substantive signiﬁcance of the
diversity–trust relationship. Thus, while we may not be able to reject the null hypothesis
of zero correlation in the population, it is not yet clear that the magnitude of the association
between diversity and trust should really be a cause for concern with regard to the future
well-being of multi-cultural societies.
Our aim in this article, then, is to question the view that ethnic diversity has a strong,
linear inﬂuence on the extent to which citizens trust one another and, instead, to highlight
its essentially weak and contingent nature. By contrast, neighbourhood socio-economic
deprivation and the degree of social integration of individuals within their communities
are, we argue, more appropriate sites of academic and policy concern. The article
proceeds as follows. First, we review in more detail the existing evidence base relating
to the effect of ethnic diversity on trust. Next, we describe the data and key measures
to be used in our statistical models, before presenting the results of these analyses. We
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our ﬁndings for our understanding
of how, if at all, the ethnic diversity of a neighbourhood affects the interpersonal trust of
its residents.
THE EXISTING EVIDENCE
American Exceptionalism?
As we noted above, the majority of published accounts of the diversity–trust relationship
are based on North American data.6 This does not, in itself, problematize the statistical
4 Dietland Stolle, Stuart N. Soroka and Richard Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?
Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions’, Political
Studies, 56 (2008), 57–75.
5 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’. It is important to note that, in Putnam’s account, the corrosive effects
of ethnic diversity are argued to be evident only in the short to medium term; in the long run, the
hunkering-down mechanism stops and inter-ethnic distrust dissipates. However, only anecdotal evidence
is presented in support of this benign denouement, and therefore its status must be considered at present
as little more than speculative.
6 For our purposes here, we include only studies that have directly investigated the association
between area-level ethnic diversity and trust. Thus, we exclude studies that have approached the same
substantive question but without using independently collected area-level measures of diversity (e.g. Peter
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analyses underpinning the conclusions of these studies. However, the limited range of
contexts in which the negative association between community diversity and trust has
been observed has implications for the generality of the conclusions that have been
drawn.7 For, if racial and ethnic heterogeneity really do cause people to ‘hunker down’
and view one another with distrust and suspicion, we should expect this effect to generalize to
most, if not all, social and political contexts.
It is entirely plausible, though, that the effect of ethnic diversity on civic attitudes is
particular to the speciﬁc political and historical context in which the current level of ethnic
diversity was instantiated.8 In the United States, for instance, the ethnic diversity of most
neighbourhoods is highly tainted by the legacy of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
slavery and its social and political aftermath in the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst centuries.
This is a feature of inter-ethnic identity which is considerably less salient in Britain and
other European countries with signiﬁcant proportions of black citizens. In short, the
nature and implications of ethnic diversity is highly historically contingent, and we cannot
assume, without evidence, that associations observed in one context will generalize in a
straightforward manner to others. And, indeed, in the analyses that have been conducted
in contexts outside of North America, the results and conclusions drawn have been
considerably more equivocal about the inﬂuence of diversity on social capital. Letki, for
example, ﬁnds no effect of ethnic diversity on social interaction within local communities
in Britain, once the degree of economic deprivation of neighbourhoods has been taken
into account,9 while Leigh ﬁnds no effect of ethnic or linguistic fractionalization on a measure
of generalized trust in the Australian context.10
The possibility of ‘American exceptionalism’, of course, echoes critiques of Putnam’s
broader thesis of America’s civic decline since a notional heyday in the 1950s. The failure
to corroborate the long-term decline in trust and associational membership in comparable
socio-political contexts questions the universalistic nature of the proposed causal
mechanisms.11 The research we report on here will, we hope, go some way towards redressing
this comparative imbalance.
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Perspective: Introduction to the Symposium’, Political Studies, 56 (2008), 1–11.
9 Natalia Letki, ‘Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighbour-
hoods’, Political Studies, 56 (2008), 99–126. Letki does, however, ﬁnd a negative effect of ethnic diversity on a
latent variable which she labels ‘neighbourhood attitudes’ that includes a ‘trust in neighbours’ item. However,
this variable also incorporates three additional items relating to different aspects of neighbourhood perceptions,
including social contact, which as we make clear in our later discussion of the theoretical mechanism through
which diversity is argued to inﬂuence trust, should be considered separately.
10 Andrew Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’, Economic Record, 82 (2006), 268–80.
11 Peter A Hall, ‘Social Capital in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 29 (1999), 417–61; Paola
Grenier and Karen Wright, ‘Social Capital in Britain: Exploring the Hall Paradox’, Policy Studies, 27
(2006), 27–53; Dietland Stolle and Marc Hooghe, ‘Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The
Debate About the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies’, British
Journal of Political Science, 35 (2005), 149–67; Robert Andersen, James Curtis and Edward Grabb,
‘Trends in Civic Association Activity in Four Democracies: The Special Case of Women in the United
States’, American Sociological Review, 71 (2006), 376–400.
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Contact or Conﬂict?
Putnam’s account of the effects of immigration and ethnic diversity contrasts two
opposing mechanisms from the social psychological literature on inter-group contact. On
the one hand, while diversity might serve to improve inter-ethnic relations by replacing
unfounded negative beliefs and stereotypes with more positive evaluations derived
through direct contact, ‘contact theory suggests that diversity erodes the in-group/out-
group distinction and enhances out-group solidarity or bridging social capital, thus
lowering ethnocentrism’.12 On the other hand, conﬂict theory suggests that interaction
between different ethnic groups will, as the name suggests, result in tension and hostility,
primarily through competition for scarce resources and access to public goods, but also
through innate psychological processes of in-group and out-group identiﬁcation.13
However, while these mechanisms of conﬂict and contact are presented as alternative or
competing explanations, it seems more reasonable to anticipate that both processes will
operate in tandem in most neighbourhoods.14 That is, for some individuals, direct contact
will reduce distrust of those from ethnic out-groups; while, for others, the appearance of
new ethnic groups in a neighbourhood will lead to avoidance of social contact and the
development, or exacerbation, of existing stereotypes and out-group mistrust.
An appropriate test of this contingent view of the contact/conﬂict mechanisms requires the
estimation of the interaction between ethnic diversity and the level of interpersonal contact
between an individual and the residents of his or her neighbourhood, in addition to the main
effect of diversity. This type of multiplicative speciﬁcation allows the degree of contact to
determine whether diversity results in conﬂict or harmony; where contact with neighbours is
low, we might expect a corrosive effect of diversity on trust, but where it is high, diversity may
have little or no effect. In the only existing empirical investigation to date of this potential
non-linearity, Stolle et al., using data from the 2005 US Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy
(CID) survey, ﬁnd a positive interaction between perceived ethnic diversity and degree
of social contact.15 We develop this more optimistic line of inquiry here by testing the
moderating effect of social contact on the diversity–trust relationship in the British context.
We are able to build on the work of Stolle et al. by using an independent measure of
neighbourhood ethnic diversity, rather than the self-reported perceptions of survey
respondents, which are susceptible to various forms of endogeneity bias.16
To assess the conﬂict hypothesis properly, it is also important to include the moderating
effect of economic deprivation in the neighbourhood on levels of expressed trust. This is
because conﬂict theory is based on the assumption that conﬂict arises due to a perceived
threat that immigrants pose to scarce labour-market opportunities, social housing and
other public services, which in turn gives rise to out-group hostility and the propagation
of negative stereotypes. As Ross et al. put it, ‘mistrust is the product of an interaction
12 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’, p. 144.
13 J. C. Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell,
1987).
14 Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’
15 Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’
16 H. Schuman and S. Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question
Form, Wording and Context (New York: Academic Press, 1981). Self-reported diversity measures are
susceptible to the alternative explanation that those who are less trusting of ethnic out-groups over-
estimate the level of ethnic heterogeneity in their neighbourhood, a possibility that can be discounted
when using census-based measures of diversity merged with the survey micro-data.
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between person and place but the place gathers those who are susceptible and intensiﬁes
their susceptibility’.17 If conﬂict theory is correct, it follows that we should observe
stronger negative effects of ethnic diversity in more economically deprived areas, where
competition for material resources and the perception of immigrants as competing
for such resources will be at its greatest. In our analysis, then, we also allow the
effect of ethnic diversity to be contingent upon the degree of economic deprivation of
neighbourhoods.
Heterogeneity of Empirical Approaches
Our ability to arrive at general conclusions about the diversity–trust relationship is also
hampered by the wide variety of model speciﬁcations, geographies and measures of ethnic
diversity and trust that have been employed in the literature to date. For instance, while
some scholars have focused on single metropolitan areas,18 others have used nationally
representative samples at the same level of geography,19 or smaller geographical units
such as census tracts.20 Similarly, some analysts have employed ‘multi-level’ model
designs which account for the non-independence between individuals within the same
geographical units,21 while others treat the data as if it were a simple random sample.22
This wide range of approaches to model speciﬁcation extends to the use of key measures;
with diversity measured using, variously, racial and ethnic fractionalization;23 indices of
linguistic24 and birthplace fragmentation;25 percentage ‘visible minority’;26 proportion of
largest ethnic group27 and respondent assessments of neighbourhood diversity.28
17 Catherine Ross, John Mirowsky and Shana Pribesh, ‘Powerlessness and the Ampliﬁcation of Threat:
Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Mistrust’, American Sociological Review, 66 (2001), 568–91,
p. 569.
18 Melissa Marschall and Dietland Stolle, ‘Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the
Development of Generalized Trust’, Political Behavior, 26 (2004), 125–54.
19 Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrera, ‘Participation in Heterogeneous Communities’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 847–904; Costa and Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement and Community
Heterogeneity’.
20 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’;
Stuart Soroka, John F Helliwell and Richard Johnston, ‘Measuring and Modelling Interpersonal Trust’,
Social Capital, Diversity, and the Welfare State (2007).
21 Letki, ‘Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion?’; Christopher Anderson and Aida Paskeviciute, ‘How
Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Inﬂuence the Prospects for Civil Society: A Comparative Case Study
of Citizenship Behavior’, Journal of Politics, 68 (2006), 783–802; Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara,
‘Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance’ (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Reseach, 2004); Leigh, Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press).
22 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’; Rachel Pennant, ‘Diversity, Trust and Community Participation in
England’ (London: Home Ofﬁce, 2005); Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode
Trust?’
23 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’; Alesina and Ferrara, ‘Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance’.
24 Anderson and Paskeviciute, ‘How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Inﬂuence the Prospects for
Civil Society’; Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’.
25 Costa and Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity’.
26 Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, ‘Measuring and Modelling Interpersonal Trust’; Stolle, Soroka and
Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’
27 Stephan Knack, ‘Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam
Hypotheses’, Public Choice, 117 (2003), 341–55.
28 Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’
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Most importantly, perhaps, while it is clear from theoretical accounts that there exist
different forms of interpersonal trust,29 in the ethnic diversity literature trust has generally
been treated in a conceptually undifferentiated manner; diversity erodes trust but it is not
always made clear what kind of trust is being referred to.30 The most important distinction
with regard to forms of trust is between, on the one hand, trust in people with whom we are
personally acquainted and, on the other, a more diffuse trust in one’s fellow citizens, the
vast majority of whom will not be personally known to the individual making the trust
evaluation.31 Uslaner refers to the ﬁrst type of trust in known others as ‘strategic’, while trust
in people who are not personally known to us is designated ‘generalized’ trust.32 While
strategic trust is a matter of rational risk calculation, based on previous experience with the
social actor in question,33 trust in people we have never met should be considered more akin
to a social value, or an evaluation of the moral standards of the society in which we live.34
The distinction is crucial, for the sorts of societal returns which make social capital theory
so normatively appealing are generally posited to derive more from the generalized than the
particularized form of trust.35 Societies that are able to foster and maintain collective beliefs
about the goodwill of the ‘generalized other’ can reap the substantial collective and individual
beneﬁts of norms of reciprocity and co-operation.36 The same is not necessarily true, though,
of the strategic trust that develops between individuals who are personally acquainted with
one another. Indeed, ‘thick’ trust can equally well give rise to malign social phenomena,
such as ethnocentricism, terrorist cells and criminal gangs, the so-called ‘dark-side of social
capital’.37 As Uslaner puts it, ‘strategic trust can only lead to cooperation among people you
have gotten to know, so it can only resolve reasonably small-scale problems’.38 Clearly, then,
the implications of a negative relationship between neighbourhood ethnic diversity and trust
are rather different, depending on the kind of trust in question.
So, does ethnic diversity drive down generalized trust, strategic trust, or both? The
answer is, it is difﬁcult to tell, because investigators have not only been ambiguous about
which kind of trust they refer to,39 they have also used a variety of rather different
29 Margaret Levi, ‘Social and Un-Social Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s ‘‘Making
Democracy Work’’ ’, Politics and Society, 24 (1996), 45–55, Kenneth Newton, ‘Social and Political Trust’,
The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 342–62.
30 Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, ‘Measuring and Modelling Interpersonal Trust’.
31 Toshio Yamagishi, Karen S. Cook and Motoki Watabe, ‘Uncertainty, Trust and Commitment
Formation in the United States and Japan’, American Journal of Sociology, 104 (1998), 165–94.
32 Putnam (2000) makes the same distinction but labels the different types of trust as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’
respectively. Bowling Alone: ‘The collapse and revival of American Community’ (New York: Simon and
Schuster).
33 Russell Hardin, ‘Conceptions and Explanations of Trust’, in K. Cook, ed., Trust and Society (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 3–39, Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).
34 Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, ‘Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies’,
European Societies, 5 (2003), pp. 93–137.
35 Pamela Paxton, ‘Not All Association Memberships Increase Trust: A Model of Generalized Trust in
Thirty-One Countries’, Social Forces, 86 (2007), 47–76, Mark Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’,
American Journal of Sociology, 78 (1973), pp. 1360–80.
36 Francis Fukayama, Trust (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
37 Alejandro Portes, ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’, Annual Review
of Sociology, 24 (1998), 1–24, Robert D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Together’, American Prospect, 13 (2002),
20–22.
38 Eric Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 20.
39 Putnam’s account differentiates ‘inter-’ from ‘intra-’ ethnic trust but how this relates to the ‘thick/
thin’, ‘generalized/particularized’ distinction is not clear.
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measures, as if they were coterminous with one another. Although the majority of ana-
lysts have used some version of the standard generalized trust question (henceforth GTQ),
in which respondents are asked to choose whether ‘most people can be trusted’, or ‘you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people’,40 others have used ‘wallet return’ questions,41
a ‘Trust in Neighbours’ question (henceforth TiN), in which respondents are asked
how many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted;42 as well as some more
unusual variants.43
Yet, although they all relate ostensibly to the concept of interpersonal trust, these
items do not measure the same thing. Uslaner, for instance, uses factor analysis of
questions about trust in a range of different social groups and institutions to show that
the TiN item does not load uniquely on the same factor as items referring to trust in
groups that the individual does not know personally.44 Similarly, Sturgis and Smith use
‘thinkaloud protocols’ to demonstrate that responses to the TiN item predominantly
reﬂect trust evaluations of people personally acquainted with the respondent, rather
than more abstract evaluations of people in general.45 They also show that, for the
GTQ, the opposite pattern is observed; respondents asked this question mainly think of
individuals and groups with whom they are not personally acquainted when formulating
a response.46 Thus, although the distinction cannot be drawn in a neat or precise
manner, the GTQ seems to tap into the generalized form of trust, while the TiN appears
to be a mix of trust in strangers and the more strategic, or ‘thick’ variety of trust in
known others.
One might be tempted to conclude that this heterogeneity of approaches lends
robustness to the conclusion that diversity does indeed erode trust. And such an obser-
vation would be accurate if a consistent pattern of ﬁndings had been observed across
the range of geographies and measures employed. However, on closer inspection,
anomalous and inconsistent ﬁndings are frequently evident. For instance, using the 1976
Detroit Area Study, Marschall and Stolle ﬁnd ethnic fractionalization of census tracts
to be positively correlated with the GTQ,47 while Leigh, Soroka et al., and Costa and
Kahn ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association between ethnic fractionalization and the GTQ using
Australian, Canadian and US, and US data, respectively.48 Similar non-signiﬁcant
ﬁndings are apparent when the geographical focus is on countries rather than neigh-
bourhoods. Hooghe et al. ﬁnd only ‘in-migration of workers’ to be signiﬁcantly correlated
with the GTQ from amongst a host of indicators of ethnic diversity in a multi-level
40 Costa and Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist’s Perspective’;
Anderson and Paskeviciute, ‘How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Inﬂuence the Prospects for Civil
Society’; Marschall and Stolle, ‘Race and the City’.
41 Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, ‘Measuring and Modelling Interpersonal Trust’.
42 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’.
43 Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’.
44 Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust. As might be anticipated from the fact that neighbours will
generally comprise a mix of known and unknown others, the TiN item has moderate loadings on both a
‘trust in strangers’ and a ‘trust in friends and family’ component, though the highest loading is on the
latter dimension.
45 Patrick Sturgis and Patten Smith, ‘Assessing the Validity of Generalized Trust Questions: What
Kind of Trust Are We Measuring?’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 22 (2010), 74–92.
46 See also, Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust.
47 Marschall and Stolle, ‘Race and the City’.
48 Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’; Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, ‘Measuring and
Modelling Interpersonal Trust’; Costa and Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity’.
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analysis of the European Social Survey,49 while Anderson and Paskeviciute ﬁnd no
relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the GTQ using the 1999–2001 World
Values Survey.50
These anomalous ﬁndings, of course, must be weighed against the large number of
studies (including some of those cited above) that do ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative associations
using different measures of both trust and ethnic diversity.51 Our point in highlighting
these inconsistencies, though, is not to argue that ethnic diversity is unrelated to trust but
to show that the relationship is far from consistent and uniformly negative. Whether
a signiﬁcant relationship is observed or not appears to be dependent, inter alia, on the
socio-cultural context examined, key measures, model speciﬁcation and the level of
geography employed.
Statistical qua Substantive Signiﬁcance
A ﬁnal aspect of the existing evidence base that should lead us to question the generality
and importance of the conclusion that ethnic diversity erodes trust relates to the tendency
in existing studies to focus on the statistical signiﬁcance of the main effect of ethnic
diversity, rather than on the substantive magnitude of the (contingent) relationship. Yet,
despite entrenched practice in quantitative social science, it is now well appreciated that
all a signiﬁcance test reveals is whether a model coefﬁcient is non-zero in the population
from which a sample is drawn, a potentially trivial observation in large and heterogeneous
populations.52
For instance, while the ‘p value’ for the ethnic diversity coefﬁcient in Putnam’s 2007
analysis has an impressive four zeros after the decimal point, the (standardized) point
estimate is just 0.02. This means that the independent effect of ethnic diversity accounts
for less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the total variability in trust in this model.53
Where efforts have been made to place the magnitude of coefﬁcient estimates on to a
more meaningful yardstick, statistically signiﬁcant ‘effects’ of ethnic diversity have
sometimes turned out to be substantively trivial.54 In our analysis here, then, we explicitly
consider the substantive as well as the statistical signiﬁcance of the association between
diversity and trust.
49 Marc Hooghe, Tim Reeskens, Dietland Stolle and Ann Trappers, ‘Ethnic Diversity, Trust and
Ethnocentrism and Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of 21 European Countries’ (paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2006).
50 Anderson and Paskeviciute, ‘How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Inﬂuence the Prospects for
Civil Society’.
51 Robert Putnam, ‘The Strange Disappearance of Civic America’, The American Prospect, 24 (1996),
7–24; Costa and Kahn, ‘Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An Economist’s Perspective’;
Anderson and Paskeviciute, ‘How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Inﬂuence the Prospects for Civil
Society’; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’; Stephen Knack and Phillip
Keefer, ‘Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 1251–88; Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’.
52 J. Cohen, ‘The Earth Is Round (P,.05)’, American Psychologist, 49 (1994), 997–1003, David
Freedman, ‘Statistical Models and Shoe Leather’, Sociological Methodology, 21 (1991), 291–313.
53 In fact, this is itself likely to be an over-estimate. Putnam later reports that when the non-independence
between sample units is accounted for in a multi-level model, the coefﬁcient is ‘slightly lower’, although he
does not say by how much (Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’, p. 158). See also Pennant, ‘Diversity, Trust and
Community Participation in England’; Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’.
54 Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston, ‘Measuring and Modelling Interpersonal Trust’.
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DATA AND MEASURES
The data used in this analysis come from the Taking Part Survey (TPS), an annual survey
of adults in Great Britain, which has a stratiﬁed multi-stage sample design.55 The ﬁrst
interviews in the TPS took place in July 2005 and have been conducted on a continuous
basis since that time, with approximately 2,000 completed each month. The TPS achieved
a response rate of 56 per cent in 2005/6 and 55 per cent in 2006/7, the years that we use in
our analyses here. This is lower than desirable but certainly comparable to other face-to-
face probability samples conducted in Britain at this time. The potential for non-response
bias cannot be discounted but, we would argue, is less of a concern here because our
analyses focus on associational rather than descriptive estimates. The primary purpose of
the TPS is to measure the participation of different social and demographic groups across
a broad range of sporting and cultural sectors. In addition, the TPS contains question
modules on social and cultural capital.56
The TPS has a number of advantages over alternative data sources for the purposes of our
analysis here. First, it contains both the standard GTQ and the TiN item. Secondly, it has an
extremely large sample size, with approximately 25,000 interviews conducted in total each
year. Thirdly, owing to the policy requirement to assess both levels and annual change in
participation within and across ethnic groups accurately,57 the TPS contains an over-sample
of black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. Finally, because the TPS implements a clustered
sample design, we are able to study the inﬂuence of the characteristics of the neighbourhoods
within which respondents live on their expressed levels of trust.
The TPS uses a standard sample design for random, face-to-face surveys in Britain,
in which postcode sectors are randomly selected from the Postcode Address File with
the probability of selection proportional to the size of the sector. An equal-sized sample
of addresses is then selected at random within each sector and an individual randomly
selected for interview from among the adult members (161) in each selected address.58 The
over-sample of BME groups is achieved by means of focused enumeration.59 FE works by
sampling addresses adjacent to the main sample address. When contact is made with the main
sample address, the interviewer asks whether any target individuals live in the adjacent
addresses. If any such individuals are identiﬁed, the address in question is contacted and an
interview attempted with a randomly selected individual at that household.
Deﬁning Neighbourhoods
The clustered nature of the TPS sample design enables us to use a multi-level model, in which
individual respondents are nested within ‘neighbourhoods’. Since postcode sectors are not a
particularly meaningful level of geography with regard to neighbourhoods or local areas,60 we
55 The TPS is funded by the Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (see http://www.culture.
gov.uk/4828.aspx).
56 See Joel Williams, ‘Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture, Leisure and Sport (2005–06), Final
Technical Report’ (London: Department for Culture, Media, and Sport, 2006).
57 Rebecca Aust and Lisa Vine, ‘Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture, Leisure and Sport,
Annual Report 2005/2006’ (London: Department for Culture, Media, and Sport, 2007).
58 Where there is more than one household at an address, a single household is selected at random.
59 C. Brown and J. Ritchie, ‘Focused Enumeration: The Development of a Method for Sampling
Ethnic Minority Groups’ (London: PSI/SCPR, 1981).
60 R. Johnston et al., ‘Fractal Factors? Scale, Factor Analyses and Neighbourhood Effects’, ESRC
Research Methods Programme Working Paper, 2 (2005), 1–24.
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use the recently created Super Output Area (SOA) classiﬁcation. SOAs are an area classi-
ﬁcation produced by the Ofﬁce for National Statistics for the release of small area census
statistics from the 2001 Census onwards. Unlike previous geographies used for this purpose,
such as electoral wards, SOAs have been designed with the intention that they are more
homogeneous in size and remain stable over time, together with a view to maintaining
‘natural’ boundaries at a small area level.61 SOAs are hierarchical in nature, with the smallest
level being a census Output Areas (OA). OAs contain approximately 150 households and are
grouped together on the basis of homogeneity of dwelling type and tenure. In addition to the
agglomeration algorithm, initial OA deﬁnitions were sent to local authorities for feedback, to
ensure that they did not cross any clear physical boundaries such as major roads or waterways.
The lowest level OAs are then grouped together using the same clustering criteria to form
Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs), which contain, on average, around 600 households.
LSOAs are then combined in the same manner to formMiddle Super Output Areas (MSOAs)
which contain an average of 5,000 households. Upper Super Output Areas (USOAs) are
planned for the future but have not yet been produced at this point in time. For this analysis,
we have used MSOAs as our neighbourhood classiﬁcation. This is because OA and LSOA
would, on average, yield too few individuals per area for accurate estimation of random
effects.62 Our sample contains 3,927 MSOAs, with an average of 6.3 respondents per MSOA.
Neighbourhood Characteristics
Measures of neighbourhood characteristics are derived from population data made available
from the 2001 Census, covering all of England, Scotland and Wales. The 2001 Census
includes a range of items covering the geo-demographic and structural character of each
neighbourhood. This is based on aggregated responses from all the individuals living within
each deﬁned area, with characteristics represented as proportions of the total. By using
neighbourhood data from sources independent of the TPS, we are able to have greater
conﬁdence that they accurately represent the effect of neighbourhood differences, rather
than the composition of the TPS sample within each selected area.63 For the purposes of this
analysis, data have been obtained from the Ofﬁce for National Statistics on all 6,780 MSOA
in England, with measures selected based on previous research that has incorporated the
impact of neighbourhood socio-economic characteristics.64
The measures cover the extent of economic disadvantage of the neighbourhood, the
occupational structure, housing tenure and household types, residential mobility, the age
61 David Martin, ‘Geography for the 2001 Census in England and Wales’ (London: Ofﬁce for National
Statistics, 2001).
62 Cora Maas and Joop Hox, ‘Sufﬁcient Sample Sizes for Multilevel Modeling’, Methodology: European
Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1 (2005), 85–91.
63 Robert Sampson, Jeffrey Morenoff and Thomas Gannon-Rowley, ‘Assessing ‘‘Neighbourhood
Effects’’: Social Processes and New Directions in Research’, Annual Review of Sociology, 28 (2002),
443–78.
64 See, for example: C. Hale, P. Pack and J. Salkfeld, ‘The Structural Determinants of Fear of Crime:
An Analysis Using Census and Crime Survey Data from England and Wales’, International Review of
Victimology, 3 (1994), 211–33; Christopher Lowenkamp, Francis Cullen and Travis Pratt, ‘Replicating
Sampson and Groves’s Test of Social Disorganisation Theory: Revisiting a Criminological Classic’,
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40 (2003), 351–73, Robert Sampson and W. Byron Groves,
‘Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social Disorganisation Theory’, American Journal of Sociology,
94 (1989), 774–802, R. B. Taylor and J. Covington, ‘Community Structural Change and Fear of Crime’,
Social Problems, 40 (1993), 374–97.
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structure of the area, and the amount of land classiﬁed as domestic, non-domestic and green-
space. Table A1 in the Appendix provides summary details for these neighbourhood-level
variables. Multicollinearity is a common problem with the use of neighbourhood-level data
and this can lead to estimation problems, inﬂated standard errors and unstable results. To
mitigate these problems, and for parsimony of exposition, we adopt a factorial ecology
approach to generate a set of indices that summarize the strong correlations amongst the
identiﬁed neighbourhood characteristics.65
The factorial ecology approach involves subjecting the raw neighbourhood characteristic
variables to a principal components analysis with oblique rotation. This yielded a ﬁve-
component solution, using the retention criterion of eigenvalues.1.66 The factor structure is
very similar to that reported in previous factorial ecology studies in Britain.67 The factor
loading matrix for this ﬁve-component solution is presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The ﬁve components represent the following ﬁve summary characteristics of neighbourhoods:
— economic deprivation
— urbanization
— in-migration and out-migration
— age structure
— housing stock.
Ethnic Diversity
The level of ethnic diversity of each MSOA is assessed using the Herﬁndahl fractionalization
index, where:
Diversity ¼ 1
Xn
i¼1
s2i ð1Þ
In this equation, si reﬂects the population share of ethnic group i, from a total of ﬁve
groups: white, black, Asian, mixed and ‘other’ ethnic group. These are collapsed cate-
gories from the full census classiﬁcation. We do not use the full ethnic classiﬁcation from
the Census due to the large number of empty cells when constructing the index at the
MSOA level. This inevitably results in some rather crude aggregations across different
ethnic groups but is unlikely to affect our results and conclusions, because there is a high
degree of correspondence between the index derived from all ethnic groups and that based
on the aggregated categories.68 To calculate the index, we sum the squared proportion of
each ethnic group, and subtract this total from 1. This quantity yields the probability
of two randomly selected individuals from the same locality being of different ethnic
origin. The theoretical range of the index runs from 0 to 1, with 0 representing an area
in which every individual is from the same ethnic group and 1 representing an area in
which each individual is from a different ethnic group. In practice, the median value of the
65 J. D. Morenoff and R. J. Sampson, ‘Violent Crime and the Spatial Dynamics of Neighbourhood
Transition: Chicago, 1970–1990’, Social Forces, 76 (1997), 31–64.
66 H. F. Kaiser, ‘A Second-Generation Little Jiffy’, Psychometrika, 35 (1970), 401–15.
67 Johnston et al., ‘Fractal Factors? Scale, Factor Analyses and Neighbourhood Effects’; C. Propper
et al., ‘Local Neighbourhood and Mental Health: Evidence from the UK’, ESRC Research Methods
Programme Working Paper 6 (2005).
68 Pearson correlation5 0.981 (p, 0.001).
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index is 0.14 with a standard deviation of 0.18 (minimum5 0.004; maximum5 0.711).
Figure A1 in the Appendix shows a histogram of this index across the 3,927 MSOAs.
Since the distribution of the index is highly positively skewed, we take the natural log
of the raw index for use in our models. Other indices of ethnic diversity and segregation
are available, but we use the Herﬁndahl measure for consistency with the existing
literature.69
The fact that we are using data from the 2001 Census to construct our measure of
ethnic diversity means that there is a ﬁve-year gap between the point at which neigh-
bourhood diversity was measured and the point at which respondents to the survey were
interviewed. Although changes in the diversity of neighbourhoods between these time
points would not be detected, the effect of this is likely to be minimal, due to the high
degree of stability in indices of neighbourhood diversity over such a relatively short time
period.70 The period 2001–07 does, though, include the rapid increase in immigration to
Britain from the accession countries of Eastern Europe, and therefore it is important to
acknowledge that our analysis is not able to take account of this recent and somewhat
controversial wave of immigration in our measure of diversity. However, although East
European immigration undoubtedly resulted in some hostility towards the immigrant
groups in speciﬁc areas of Britain, its effect on the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods in
Britain as a whole was minimal. This is because the total number of immigrants, though
this ﬁgure is subject to some uncertainty,71 was small relative to the total population but
also because the vast majority of East European immigrants would be classiﬁed as ‘white’
under the census categorization anyway.
Individual-Level Covariates
In addition to the characteristics of areas, we also include a broad range of individual-
level covariates that have been found in previous research to be correlated with trust.72
These are: age; sex; social class; health status; marital status; housing tenure; extent to
which individuals know their neighbours; life-happiness; ethnicity; educational attain-
ment; time spent watching television; time lived in the area; and annual gross earnings.73
The Trust Measures
The TPS contains the generalized trust question (GTQ), which is taken from Rosenberg’s
misanthropy scale, and, as we argued earlier, taps the ‘generalized’, or ‘moralistic’, form
of trust:74
69 cf. Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’.
70 For all MSOAs, the correlation between the 1991 and 2001 Herﬁndahl indices is 0.971.
71 The Institute of Public Policy Research estimates that the total number of post-2004 immigrants
from Eastern Europe was 550,000 (see Naomi Pollard, Maria Latorre and Sriskandarajah Dhananjayan,
‘Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post EU-Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK’ (London: IPPR,
2008).
72 Alesina and Ferrera, ‘Who Trusts Others?’; Delhey and Newton, ‘Who Trusts?’; Delhey and Newton,
‘Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust’; Yaojun Li, Andrew Pickles and Mike Savage, ‘Social
Capital and Social Trust in Britain’, European Sociological Review, 21 (2005), 109–23.
73 Twenty per cent of respondents provided no answer to the earnings question, and therefore this was
imputed using a hot-deck procedure in STATA 10. See Adrian Mander and David Clayton, ‘Hotdeck
Imputation’, Stata Technical Bulletin, 9 (2000), 32–34.
74 Morris Rosenberg, ‘Misanthropy and Political Ideology’, American Sociological Review 21 (1956), 690–95.
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Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?
The TPS also contains the trust in neighbours (TiN) item. Reﬂecting the fact that most
people will know some, but not all of their neighbours, this item is more a combination of
trust in strangers (in the neighbourhood) and the ‘strategic’ type of trust endowed in
people with whom we are personally acquainted:
Would you sayy
1. Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted, 2. Some can be trusted, 3. A
few can be trusted, 4. (or that) No one can be trusted (?)
The trust questions are administered to a random half of the full TPS sample each year.
In addition, the GTQ was only administered in the second year of the survey (2006). This
yields an analytical sample size of 11,963 for the GTQ item and, by combining the data
from years 1 and 2, 24,922 for the TiN item.
ANALYSIS
To model simultaneously the effect of individual and area level characteristics on indi-
vidual level trust, we use a multi-level modelling framework.75 This enables us to account
properly for the non-independence between respondents within the same geographical
location and to model heterogeneity in trust at the neighbourhood level as a function of
characteristics of neighbourhoods. We specify models with a random intercept and ran-
dom coefﬁcients. In conceptual terms, this means that each neighbourhood is allowed to
have its own mean level of trust and the coefﬁcients for the individual-level covariates are
allowed to take on different values in different areas. For the TiN item, the model has the
following form (for simplicity of exposition, Equation 2 shows only the reduced form
equation and a single covariate at each level):
yij ¼ b0 þ b1xij þ awj þ ðu0j þ u1j þ e0ijÞ ð2Þ
Where yij is trust for the ith individual in the jth area, b0 is the intercept, b1 is the
regression coefﬁcient for individual i in area j for the individual level covariate x, and a is
the regression coefﬁcient for the area level covariate, w, in area j. The part of Equation 2
in parentheses shows the random effects; u0j is the area level error for the random
intercept, u1j is the corresponding random error for the regression coefﬁcient, and e0ij is a
person-speciﬁc error. These random effects are assumed to have means of 0 and normally
distributed variances denoted, respectively, by s2u0, s
2
u1 and s
2
e , as well as the covariance
between the random intercept and the random coefﬁcient, su0u1. All right-hand side
variables are centred at their mean values.76 Since the GTQ item is binary, we specify a
logit link function for Models 1a–6a, in which it is the outcome, so that the coefﬁcients
represent the log of the odds such that the respondent selects the trusting response
alternative, for each unit change in the covariate.77
75 Harvey Goldstein,Multilevel Statistical Models 3rd Edition, 3rd edn (London: Arnold, 2003); J. Hox,
Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications. (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002).
76 Hox,Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications (Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
2002).
77 See Sophia Rabe-Hesketh and Anders Skrondal, Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata,
2nd edn (College Station, Tex.: Stata Press, 2008).
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Our modelling strategy proceeds in the following manner. First, we specify a ‘null’
model with a random intercept but no individual or neighbourhood-level covariates. This
provides us with a descriptive picture of how the total variability in trust is partitioned
across individuals and areas, before accounting for compositional differences between
neighbourhoods. Next, we introduce our measure of ethnic diversity, the Herﬁndahl
index, as a neighbourhood-level predictor to investigate its unconditional relationship
with trust. We then replace the Herﬁndahl index with the individual-level covariates in a
third model, before introducing the additional neighbourhood characteristics in a fourth.
These models allow us to investigate the extent to which the characteristics of individuals
and neighbourhoods are able to account for variability in trust, relative to ethnic diversity
considered on its own. In Model 5, we make our key comparison – between the condi-
tional and the unconditional effect of ethnic diversity by reintroducing the Herﬁndahl
index. In the ﬁnal model, Model 6, we introduce the interactions between the Herﬁndahl
index and (a) the number of people the respondent knows in the area and (b) the
economic deprivation of the neighbourhood. The coefﬁcients for these interactions enable
tests of the contact/conﬂict hypotheses. If contact between different ethnic groups
increases trust, we should observe a positive interaction for (a). In contrast, if conﬂict over
scarce resources reduces trust, we should observe a negative interaction for (b).78
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the model parameter estimates for the generalized trust item. Model 1a
shows that, before controlling for differences between individuals and neighbourhoods,
15.3 per cent of the variability in generalized trust is situated at the neighbourhood
level. Model 2a introduces ethnic diversity as an area-level predictor, which, although
statistically signiﬁcant, has little explanatory power, with the unexplained neighbourhood-
level variance reduced by less than a third of 1 per cent. The coefﬁcients for the individual-
level ﬁxed effects in Models 3a–6a are in line with the results of previous cross-sectional
investigations. Men, older people, those in higher social class groups, those in better
health and who are happier with their lives have higher level qualiﬁcations, and those who
are personally acquainted with their neighbours have a higher probability of selecting the
trusting response alternative. Conversely, more time spent watching television, being divorced
or separated, and living in social housing are characteristics related to a reduced probability
of trust. There are differences in trust between ethnic groups, with blacks being less trusting
than whites, Asians and those of ‘other’ ethnic origins. Those of mixed ethnic origin are the
most trusting of all these rather broad ethnic categorizations. Length of residence in the
neighbourhood is associated with lower levels of trust, a somewhat counter-intuitive ﬁnding,
which is likely to be due to the constraints on residential mobility experienced by those living
in more run-down and economically deprived neighbourhoods.
In Model 4a, the neighbourhood-level characteristics are introduced as covariates. As
expected, more economically deprived areas, those with higher rates of recorded crime,
greater population turnover and poorer housing-stock have lower levels of generalized
trust. The degree of urbanization and the age proﬁle of the neighbourhood have no
independent effect. The difference in trust between blacks and other ethnic groups is now
78 Models are estimated in STATA 10 using the xtmixed and xtmelogit commands. See Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal, Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, 2nd edn.
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TABLE 1 Random Effects Logit Models – Generalized Trust
Predictor Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a
Level 1 ﬁxed effects
Sex (male5 1) 0.207 (.046) 0.221 (.046) 0.221 (.046) 0.225 (.047)
Age (years) 0.014 (.002) 0.012 (.002) 0.012 (.002) 0.012 (.002)
Time lived in area 20.037 (.014) 20.028 (.014) 20.028 (.014) 20.030 (.014)
Hours watching TV/week 20.044 (.015) 20.034 (.015) 20.034 (.015) 20.034 (.015)
Social class (ref5working class)
middle class 0.154 (.052) 0.122 (.052) 0.123 (.052) 0.127 (.053)
own account workers 0.096 (.080) 0.063 (.080) 0.064 (.080) 0.063 (.082)
General health 20.142 (.026) 20.133 (.026) 20.133 (.026) 20.137 (.026)
Happy with life 0.051 (.013) 0.049 (.013) 0.049 (.013) 0.049 (.013)
Marital status (ref5 single)
married/cohabiting 20.042 (.058) 20.040 (.058) 20.040 (.058) 20.041 (.059)
widowed 0.059 (.094) 0.074 (.094) 0.073 (.094) 0.069 (.096)
divorced/separated 20.120 (.081) 20.099 (.081) 20.099 (.081) 20.106 (.082)
Qualiﬁcations (ref5other quals)
no qualiﬁcations 20.100 (.059) 20.062 (.059) 20.062 (.059) 20.064 (.060)
degree or equivalent 0.273 (.055) 0.244 (.055) 0.244 (.055) 0.251 (.055)
Tenure (ref5 social tenant)
home owner 0.362 (.063) 0.297 (.065) 0.296 (.065) 0.305 (.066)
private tenant 0.315 (.082) 0.223 (.083) 0.223 (.083) 0.231 (.084)
Ethnic group (ref5white)
mixed 0.437 (.205) 0.467 (.206) 0.471 (.206) 0.484 (.208)
Asian 20.072 (.096) 0.022 (.098) 0.029 (.101) 0.031 (.101)
black 20.389 (.126) 20.281 (.129) 20.275 (.131) 20.256 (.132)
other ethnic group 20.420 (.278) 20.399 (.280) 20.396 (.281) 20.375 (.283)
Know neighbours 0.385 (.026) 0.373 (.026) 0.373 (.026) 0.371 (.028)
Annual gross earnings 0.024 (.010) 0.019 (.010) 0.019 (.010) 0.017 (.010)
Level 2 ﬁxed effects
(Logged) ethnic diversity 20.301 (.049) 20.026 (.080) 0.032 (.169)
Recorded crime 20.151 (.055) 20.148 (.056) 20.141 (.057)
Economic deprivation 20.159 (.037) 20.159 (.037) 20.187 (.061)
Urbanization 20.030 (.031) 20.023 (.037) 20.028 (.037)
In- and out-migration 0.112 (.027) 0.115 (.029) 0.114 (.029)
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Predictor Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a
Age proﬁle 20.019 (.026) 20.016 (.029) 20.018 (.029)
Housing stock 20.101 (.026) 20.104 (.027) 20.113 (.028)
Diversity*Know neighbours 0.068 (.050)
Diversity*Deprivation 20.009 (.023)
Intercept 20.308 (.026) 20.301 (.026) 20.376 (.110) 20.342 (.110) 20.343 (.110) 20.387 (.192)
Random effects
Variance (neighbours) 0.086 (.041)
Variance (intercept) 0.595 (.540) 0.583 (.053) 0.490 (.051) 0.434 (.048) 0.434 (.048) 0.438 (.049)
Variance (residual) 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29
Covariance (neighbours*intercept) 0.105 (.033)
% neighbourhood-level variance 15.32% 15.05% 12.96% 11.66% 11.67% 11.75%
Source: Taking Part Survey 2005–2007; n5 11,963; coefﬁcients are logits; underlined coefﬁcients are non-signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent level of
conﬁdence.
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reduced by around a quarter. This demonstrates that if we fail to take account of the
social and economic composition of neighbourhoods, incorrect inferences can be made
about differences in trust between ethnic groups. The combined effect of the individual
and neighbourhood-level characteristics reduces the level 2 variance component to 11.7
per cent, a quarter of the total neighbourhood-level variability in trust.
Of greater interest for our purposes here, however, is the non-signiﬁcant effect of ethnic
diversity in Model 5; when we control for compositional differences between areas, ethnic
diversity is completely unrelated to generalized trust. Neither is this relationship mod-
erated by the degree of social contact or economic deprivation in the neighbourhood
(Model 6a); it is zero order irrespective of the extent of personal familiarity people have
with their neighbours, or the degree of economic deprivation of the area. The random
part of Model 6a shows that there is a signiﬁcant random coefﬁcient for the variable
‘know neighbours’ and a signiﬁcant negative covariance between this random coefﬁcient
and the random intercept. In substantive terms, the random coefﬁcient indicates that the
association between the extent to which people know their neighbours and generalized
trust is signiﬁcantly different across neighbourhoods. The negative covariance indicates
that the magnitude of the coefﬁcient for the variable ‘know neighbours’ is highest in areas
with low levels of generalized trust, and vice versa. That is, the importance of social
contact in fostering generalized trust is greatest in neighbourhoods where trust is low.
Turning next to the TiN item, Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for these models.
Although the coefﬁcients are now the expected change in the mean rather than the log
odds of trust, the pattern of magnitude and signiﬁcance is similar in many respects to that
found for the generalized trust models; age, social class, health status, life happiness,
housing tenure and knowing one’s neighbours are all signiﬁcant and in the same direction
as was found for the GTQ. There are, however, some notable differences that serve to
bear out the observation that these items do not measure the same form of trust. There is
no difference in trust between men and women, while Asians, blacks and those from other
ethnic groups are now all less trusting than are whites and those of mixed ethnic back-
grounds. The amount of time spent watching television is now not signiﬁcantly related to
trust,79 while being separated or divorced, having no qualiﬁcations and higher gross
annual earnings are. The neighbourhood-level variance component in Model 1b, at 17.5
per cent, is of a similar magnitude to the same ‘intercept only’ model for the GTQ item.
The unconditional effect of ethnic diversity in Model 2b is again negative and signiﬁcant,
although this time it is of a considerably greater magnitude, explaining 27 per cent of the
neighbourhood-level variability in strategic trust. This, of course, takes no account of
compositional differences between neighbourhoods, which may themselves be correlated
with both ethnic diversity and trust. Models 3b and 4b introduce individual-level and
neighbourhood-level covariates, which together reduce the unexplained neighbourhood-
level variance to just 5 per cent, explaining more than two-thirds of the total variance
partitioned at the neighbourhood level. The estimates for the neighbourhood characteristics
are also broadly similar to those obtained for the GTQ, but for the TiN item, ‘in and
out-migration’ is not signiﬁcant, while the type of housing stock is. Although reduced in
magnitude by approximately 85 per cent from the unconditional model (2b), the coefﬁcient
for ethnic diversity in Model 5b is statistically signiﬁcant at the 99 per cent level of conﬁdence.
79 Putnam identiﬁes television as the ‘mysterious anti-civic X-ray’ responsible for the precipitate decline
in trust and other indicators of social capital in the United States since the 1950s (Putnam, ‘The Strange
Disappearance of Civic America’).
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TABLE 2 Random Effects Models – Trust in Neighbours
Predictor Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b
Level 1 ﬁxed effects
Sex (male5 1) 0.007 (.010) 0.009 (.010) 0.009 (.010) 0.007 (.010)
Age (years) 0.009 (.000) 0.008 (.000) 0.007 (.000) 0.008 (.000)
Time lived in area 20.009 (.003) 20.006 (.003) 20.006 (.003) 20.007 (.003)
Hours watching TV/week 20.006 (.003) 20.004 (.003) 20.004 (.003) 20.005 (.003)
Social class (ref5working class)
middle class 0.072 (.012) 0.060 (.012) 0.061 (.012) 0.059 (.012)
own account workers 0.062 (.018) 0.048 (.018) 0.048 (.018) 0.047 (.018)
General health 20.042 (.006) 20.038 (.006) 20.038 (.006) 20.038 (.006)
Happy with life 0.028 (.003) 0.028 (.003) 0.028 (.003) 0.028 (.003)
Marital status (ref5 single)
married/cohabiting 0.033 (.013) 0.019 (.013) 0.018 (.013) 0.015 (.013)
widowed 0.034 (.021) 0.030 (.021) 0.029 (.021) 0.025 (.021)
divorced/separated 20.043 (.018) 20.043 (.018) 20.043 (.018) 20.048 (.018)
Qualiﬁcations (ref5 other quals)
no qualiﬁcations 20.068 (.013) 20.047 (.013) 20.046 (.013) 20.050 (.013)
degree or equivalent 0.108 (.013) 0.106 (.012) 0.106 (.012) 0.103 (.012)
Tenure (ref5 social tenant)
home owner 0.261 (.014) 0.204 (.014) 0.203 (.014) 0.205 (.014)
private renter 0.228 (.019) 0.181 (.019) 0.181 (.019) 0.186 (.019)
Ethnic group (ref5white)
mixed 20.132 (.042) 20.055 (.042) 20.045 (.042) 20.044 (.042)
Asian 20.182 (.022) 20.096 (.021) 20.076 (.021) 20.065 (.021)
black 20.221 (.026) 20.096 (.026) 20.082 (.027) 20.079 (.027)
other ethnic group 20.332 (.062) 20.248 (.062) 20.238 (.062) 20.232 (.062)
Know neighbours 0.410 (.006) 0.397 (.006) 0.398 (.006) 0.396 (.006)
Annual gross earnings 0.007 (.002) 0.007 (.002) 0.007 (.002) 0.007 (.002)
Level 2 ﬁxed effects
(Logged) ethnic diversity 20.406 (.014) 20.060 (.017) 20.156 (.037)
Recorded crime 20.036 (.012) 20.028 (.012) 20.030 (.012)
Economic deprivation 20.108 (.006) 20.108 (.013) 20.074 (.013)
Urbanization 20.081 (.006) 20.067 (.008) 20.059 (.008)
In- and out-migration 20.014 (.006) 20.006 (.007) 20.007 (.007)
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Age proﬁle 20.035 (.006) 20.027 (.006) 20.029 (.006)
Housing stock 20.015 (.006) 20.021 (.006) 20.017 (.006)
Diversity*know neighbours 0.047 (.012)
Diversity*deprivation 0.013 (.005)
Intercept 3.026 (.008) 3.060 (.007) 3.040 (.025) 3.041 (.025) 3.039 (.024) 3.130 (.042)
Random effects
Variance (neighbours) 0.021 (.002)
Variance (intercept) 0.141 (.006) 0.097 (.004) 0.047 (.003) 0.0285 (.002) 0.0281 (.002) 0.033 (.003)
Variance (residual) 0.666 (.006) 0.664 (.006) 0.520 (.005) 0.517 (.004) 0.517 (.004) 0.499 (.004)
Covariance (neighbours*intercept) 20.026 (.002)
% neighbourhood-level variance 17.54% 12.81% 8.29% 5.22% 5.16% 6.3%
Source: Taking Part Survey 2005–2007; n5 24,922; coefﬁcients are expected change in mean of trust for unit change in predictor; underlined
coefﬁcients are non-signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent level of conﬁdence.
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Even controlling for this broad spectrum of individual-level and neighbourhood-level
characteristics, then, individuals in more ethnically diverse neighbourhoods are less
trusting of the people living in those neighbourhoods. So, following Putnam, we can also
conﬁdently conclude that the association between diversity and the kind of trust measured
by the TiN item is highly unlikely to be zero in the population.
Before considering the substantive importance of the diversity–strategic trust associa-
tion, let us ﬁrst examine the moderating inﬂuence of social contact and economic
deprivation on this relationship. Model 6b introduces interactions between diversity and
social contact and neighbourhood deprivation. Both coefﬁcients are positive and sig-
niﬁcant. For the ‘know neighbours’ variable, this means that the more people an indi-
vidual knows in his or her neighbourhood, the weaker the negative association between
diversity and trust becomes. So, as Stolle et al. have argued, whether diversity results in
‘conﬂict’ or not appears to depend, in the British as in the American context, on the extent
of contact between an individual and those in his or her neighbourhood.80 If you are
personally acquainted with many people in your neighbourhood, diversity has little or no
effect on your trust in them. As with Model 6a for generalized trust, there is a signiﬁcant
negative covariance between the random intercept and the random coefﬁcient for the
‘know neighbours’ variable; the importance of knowing one’s neighbours is greatest in
areas of low neighbourhood-level trust.
As for the deprivation–diversity coefﬁcient, conﬂict theory should lead us to anticipate a
negative interaction between these variables; so the positive coefﬁcient for this interaction is in
the opposite direction to what conﬂict theory would lead us to expect – the negative rela-
tionship between diversity and trust is at its weakest in the most economically deprived areas.
The converse, of course, is also true; as economic deprivation decreases, the magnitude of the
negative relationship between ethnic diversity and trust increases. So, if diversity does indeed
erode trust, this corrosive inﬂuence would not appear to arise out of conﬂict over scarce
resources, or at least not those with localized markets, such as social housing and jobs.
Turning ﬁnally to a consideration of the substantive signiﬁcance of the ethnic diversity
coefﬁcient in the strategic trust models, we can ﬁrst consider this in terms of variance
explained. Controlling for the observed characteristics of individuals and neighbour-
hoods, we see that ethnic diversity explains only 1.4 per cent of the neighbourhood-level
variability in trust – hardly a powerful effect. By way of contrast, the neighbourhood-level
variance explained by economic deprivation is 16.3 per cent, while the ‘know neighbours’
variable accounts for 25 per cent of unexplained variance at the neighbourhood level and
16 per cent at the individual level.81 In evaluating the substantive importance of the
diversity coefﬁcient, it is also important to acknowledge the fact that the neighbourhood-
level variables available to us are unlikely to be exhaustive of the aspects of neighbour-
hoods that are correlated with trust. For instance, there is no measure of income on British
Census, and therefore we have no direct way of controlling for distributional and mean
differences in income across neighbourhoods. It is likely, therefore, that these weak estimates
of the substantive inﬂuence of ethnic diversity represent something of an upper bound.
In addition to the variance explained, it is also useful to evaluate the substantive import-
ance of regression coefﬁcients through model ﬁtted values. Figure 1 plots predicted trust
80 Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’
81 In multi-level models, level-2 ﬁxed effects can only explain variability at that level while level-1 ﬁxed
effects can explain variability at both levels if the mean of explanatory variable is not equal across level-2
units (Hox, Multilevel Analysis. Techniques and Applications).
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scores from Model 6b for different combinations of ethnic diversity, economic deprivation
and acquaintance with people in the neighbourhood. For the neighbourhood-level variables
(ethnic diversity and economic deprivation), ‘low’ and ‘high’ are deﬁned as 1.5 standard
deviations above and below the mean. For acquaintance with neighbours, values are varied
between knowing ‘lots of people’ and ‘none of the people’ in the neighbourhood. All other
variables are set at their sample mean values.
The ﬁrst thing that is clearly apparent from Figure 1 is that being acquainted with people
in the neighbourhood has a substantial positive association with trust in neighbours at all
levels of deprivation and diversity. In substantive terms, then, this social contact variable
dominates. In addition, however, it is clear that the relationship between diversity and this
kind of trust is strongly conditioned by the other two variables. It is only when individuals
live in more afﬂuent neighbourhoods and are broadly unacquainted with the people who live
there that ethnic diversity has even a moderate negative effect on trust, with a three standard
deviation unit increase in diversity reducing trust by a quarter of one point, on a four-point
scale. In areas of high deprivation, the predicted probability of trust is actually slightly
higher in more diverse areas, for individuals who know many people in their neighbourhood
(although this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant). In sum, the relationship between
ethnic diversity and strategic trust is both substantively weak and strongly moderated by the
economic and social-interactional characteristics of the neighbourhood.
DISCUSSION
The analyses we have presented here challenge the frequently articulated view, amongst
academic scholars and media commentators alike, that ethnic diversity represents a
worrying corrosive inﬂuence on trust between citizens in multi-cultural societies.82 In
contrast, the primary conclusion to be drawn from the evidence we have presented is that
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Fig. 1. Predicted values of trust in people in the neighbourhood
82 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’; Goodhart, ‘Too Diverse?’
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the diversity–trust relationship is much better characterized by its weak and contingent
nature. First in this regard, we have shown that it is essential to be clear about the sort of
trust that is being referred to and how it is being measured. While theoretical accounts
draw a clear distinction between generalized trust in strangers and strategic trust in
known others,83 this demarcation has not been sufﬁciently acknowledged in empirical
studies of the diversity–trust relationship, where a wide variety of different measures have
been used interchangeably, as if they all measured the same thing.
Using the standard question for measuring the generalized or ‘moralistic’ variety of
trust,84 we ﬁnd no evidence of a relationship between the ethnic diversity of neighbour-
hoods and the propensity of individuals to express trust in others. This ﬁnding is not an
isolated one, unique to the British context, for it corroborates a number of independent
studies already conducted in different contexts that ﬁnd no relationship between ethnic
diversity and generalized trust, as measured by the GTQ.85 And, indeed, the analyses in
Putnam’s 2007 article that principally motivate our concerns in this article are themselves
based on the ‘trust in neighbours’ item, rather than the GTQ.
One might counter here that we should not expect generalized trust to be responsive to
short- to medium-term variations in the external environment, as this kind of ‘moralistic’
trust is more akin to a core value, or personality trait developed at an early stage of the
life-course.86 Such an argument carries some weight, although it must be reconciled with
the fact that our results have shown this kind of trust to be highly responsive to the level
of economic deprivation and other social and economic features of neighbourhoods. It is
also important to bear in mind that it is this kind of generalized or ‘thick’ trust that is
argued to yield such powerful societal rewards, and it is the decline in trust as measured
by the GTQ in the General Social Survey that forms a key pillar in Putnam’s seminal
account of America’s civic decline.87 If ethnic diversity has no inﬂuence on the kind
of trust in which social capital theorists have placed so much weight in key empirical
analyses, then the implications for individual and societal well-being are considerably less
profound.
On a measure which we have argued taps more into the strategic form of trust in known
others, the ‘trust in neighbours’ (TiN) item, we found a signiﬁcant and quite substantial
unconditional negative association with ethnic diversity. However, once we controlled for
compositional and structural differences between neighbourhoods, the association became
substantively trivial, explaining just 1 per cent of the remaining neighbourhood-level
variability. Compared to other features of individuals and neighbourhoods, such as the
degree of social contact and the level of economic deprivation, the magnitude of the
ethnic diversity ‘effect’ is, at most, weak. By way of counter-factual, if it were somehow
83 Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust; Hardin, ‘Conceptions and Explanations of Trust’; Robert
D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2000).
84 Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust; Newton, ‘Social and Political Trust’.
85 Marschall and Stolle, ‘Race and the City’; Leigh, ‘Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity’;
Soroka, Helliwell and Johnston, ‘Measuring and Modelling Interpersonal Trust’; Costa and Kahn, ‘Civic
Engagement and Community Heterogeneity’; Hooghe et al., ‘Ethnic Diversity, Trust and Ethnocentrism
and Europe’; Anderson and Paskeviciute, ‘How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Inﬂuence the
Prospects for Civil Society’.
86 Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’; Uslaner, The Moral Foundations
of Trust.
87 Putnam, Bowling Alone; Paxton, ‘Not All Association Memberships Increase Trust’.
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possible to make every neighbourhood in Britain completely ethnically homogeneous, it
would have a barely perceptible impact on the extent to which the British trust people in
their neighbourhoods. In drawing these conclusions, it is important that we do not
overstate the accuracy of the measurement properties of our two outcome measures and
acknowledge that it is likely that both measures incorporate elements of both generalized
and strategic trust. For the majority of respondents, the terms ‘most people’ and ‘people
in your neighbourhood’ will evoke a mix of both strangers and individuals with whom
they are personally acquainted. That being said, however, research into the measurement
properties of these questions shows that the GTQ is considerably more likely than the
TiN item to evoke cognitive framing in respondents that corresponds to the conceptual
deﬁnition of generalized trust, while the reverse is true for strategic trust.88 A key
implication of these ﬁndings, then, is that research into the causes and consequences of
trust must pay greater attention to the type of trust being investigated and how this relates
to the choice of empirical indicators.
In addition to emphasizing the importance of the conceptual and empirical distinction
between generalized and strategic trust, we have also scrutinized the mechanisms through
which diversity has been assumed to exert its corrosive inﬂuence. On the one hand, it
is argued, diversity can ameliorate inter-group relations by dispelling misplaced fears and
stereotypes through direct contact. On the other, ethnic heterogeneity can lead to conﬂict over
perceived threats to scarce social and economic resources. In Putnam’s analysis, it is the latter
which wins out over the former in the American context, causing people of all ethnic groups
to ‘hunker down’ and view one another with suspicion and distrust. As Stolle et al. have
observed, however, these processes need not be considered mutually exclusive – diversity may
lead to hostility and distrust in the absence of social contact but this effect may be diminished,
or even reversed, as the degree of social contact increases.89 Our ﬁndings lend further
support to this contingent perspective; the relationship between diversity and strategic trust is
strongly conditioned by the extent to which an individual knows people in his or her
neighbourhood. Thus, we cannot conclude simply that ethnic diversity reduces trust, but only
that ethnic diversity can have a small negative effect on trust in neighbours, when the level of
inter-personal contact an individual has with those in his or her neighbourhood is low.
A second implication of the proposed causal mechanism is that ethnic diversity should
exert its most deleterious inﬂuence on trust in economically deprived areas, where com-
petition for public goods such as social housing, employment and local authority facilities
is at its greatest, ‘for various reasons – but, above all, contention over limited resources,
diversity fosters out-group distrust’.90 While our analysis did identify an interaction
between the ethnic diversity and economic deprivation of neighbourhoods, the coefﬁcient
was in the opposite direction to what conﬂict theory, taken at face value, would lead us to
anticipate. Ethnic diversity had no effect on strategic trust in the most deprived areas
but did have a signiﬁcant, although still weak, effect in more economically afﬂuent
neighbourhoods. Therefore, if diversity does reduce trust in one’s neighbours, it would
not appear to be a result of competition, real or imagined, between different ethnic groups
for scarce local resources.
88 Sturgis and Smith, ‘Assessing the Validity of Generalized Trust Questions: What Kind of Trust Are
We Measuring?’; Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust.
89 Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, ‘When Does Diversity Erode Trust?’
90 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’ (emphasis added).
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If conﬂict for scarce resources is not the mechanism through which diversity exerts a
negative inﬂuence on trust in neighbours, we must address the question of how the
counter-intuitive negative relationship we have observed here actually does arise. Coming,
as it does, after our empirical analyses what follows is, necessarily, speculative. In addition,
since we are dealing with interacting effects, the answer must be considered in two parts.
First, it seems likely that, in economically deprived areas, what we are witnessing is a ‘ﬂoor
effect’; the powerful negative inﬂuence of economic deprivation ‘drowns out’ any weak
effect of ethnic diversity in more deprived neighbourhoods. Or, to put it another way, the
corrosive effect of economic deprivation reduces trust to such an extent that diversity has
no further room to exert any inﬂuence in these neighbourhoods.
Secondly, in more afﬂuent areas, individuals express less trust in their neighbours if the area
is ethnically diverse and they do not know many people in the neighbourhood personally.
This contingent pattern suggests that the weak negative effect on trust arises, not from ethnic
diversity per se, but from the ‘indirect’ experience of people who, on the surface at least,
appear ‘different’. Therefore, individuals who live in afﬂuent but ethnically diverse areas will
be less trusting of people in their neighbourhood, if they have little or no direct contact with
them. These conclusions have clear implications for policy makers. To the limited extent that
societal well-being is indeed at threat from ethnic diversity of local areas, the solution would
not appear to lie in reducing, or restricting, the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods but in
fostering increased contact and communication between those communities in which people
of different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds already coexist.
CONCLUSION
The effects of ethnic and cultural diversity on civic attitudes and behaviour at both the
local and national level have long been, and remain, sensitive topics of political discourse.
Yet, debate concerning the appropriate approach to the cultural integration of immigrant
communities is often characterized by unevidenced, polarized opinions traded by ideo-
logically entrenched protagonists. It is entirely appropriate, therefore, that empirically-
oriented social scientists should contribute to a more reasoned approach to understanding
and developing policy in this area. As Putnam correctly notes, ‘it would be unfortunate if
a politically correct progressivism were to deny the reality of the challenge to social
solidarity posed by diversity’.91
Yet, while political dogma should certainly not deter social scientists from contributing
to this controversial question, it is equally imperative that research ﬁndings which imply
negative consequences arising from the presence of immigrant and ethnic minority groups
are themselves subjected to rigorous scrutiny. This has been our aim in this article. Our
ﬁndings and conclusions contradict the view that the increasing ethnic heterogeneity of
community life in the twenty-ﬁrst century represents a worrying and corrosive inﬂuence
on trust between citizens. An important limitation to this generalization is that our
conclusions relate to Britain about 2005. Failure to corroborate the pattern of results that
has been observed in the United States does not negate those ﬁndings but does, we
contend, pose a strong challenge to claims of their universalistic nature.
91 Putnam, ‘E Pluribus Unum’, p. 165.
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APPEND IX
TABLE A1 Summary Statistics for Neighbourhood Characteristics
Neighbourhood measure
Mean
(%)
Minimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
Standard
deviation
% working population on income
support
3.8 0 22 2.8
% lone parent families 2.7 0 10 1.3
% local authority housing 13.1 0 78 13.1
% working population unemployed 3.4 1 12 1.7
% non-car owning households 26.3 3 74 14.3
% professional/managerial 31.8 7 70 12.2
% owner occupied housing 29.3 2 68 10.3
% domestic property 6.6 0 34 5.2
% green-space 51.9 0 99 28
Population density (per square KM) 30.2 0.06 230.1 30.4
% working in agriculture 1.5 0 19 2.1
% in migration 10.9 4 59 5
% out migration 10.2 5 49 3.9
% single person, non-pens’r households 15.4 5 60 6.6
% commercial property 3.5 0 49 4.1
%. 1.5 people per room 0.6 0 11 1
% resident population . 65 16 2 49 4.8
% resident population, 16 30.1 4 37 3.6
% terraced housing 25.7 1 88 16.3
% vacant property 3.1 0 22 2.1
% ﬂats 13.5 0 90 13.8
Number of neighbourhoods 6,781
TABLE A2 Rotated Factor Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of
Neighbourhood Characteristic Variables
Neighbourhood measure
Socio-economic
disadvantage Urbanization
Population
mobility
Age
proﬁle
Housing
proﬁle
% working population on
income support
0.890 0.245 0.191 0.138 0.092
% lone parent families 0.847 0.222 0.002 0.263 0.153
% local authority housing 0.846 0.064 20.009 0.146 20.168
% working population
unemployed
0.843 0.293 0.173 0.118 0.125
% non-car owning
households
0.798 0.417 0.363 20.010 0.057
% professional/managerial 20.787 0.002 0.153 0.146 20.368
% owner occupied housing 20.608 20.249 20.349 20.572 0.053
% domestic property 0.104 0.921 0.165 0.052 0.112
% green-space 20.214 20.902 20.180 20.011 20.043
Population density (per
square KM)
0.245 0.824 0.262 0.150 20.135
% working in agriculture 20.126 20.663 20.006 20.183 20.030
% in-migration 20.074 0.102 0.916 0.069 0.071
% out-migration 20.019 0.162 0.903 0.119 0.134
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Neighbourhood measure
Socio-economic
disadvantage Urbanization
Population
mobility
Age
proﬁle
Housing
proﬁle
% single person, non-
pensioner households
0.355 0.364 0.743 0.134 20.092
% commercial property 0.378 0.432 0.529 0.019 20.093
% . 1.5 people per room 0.428 0.472 0.507 0.197 20.326
% resident population . 65 20.052 20.210 20.271 20.892 20.021
% resident population ,16 0.427 0.040 20.464 0.635 0.190
% terraced housing 0.323 0.263 0.102 0.274 0.689
% vacant property 0.319 20.118 0.485 20.173 0.530
% ﬂats 0.453 0.359 0.489 0.008 20.524
Eigenvalue 9.3 3.3 1.9 1.4 1.3
Source: Coefﬁcients in bold indicate the component on which each neighbourhood
characteristic variable loads.
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Fig. A1. Histogram of Herﬁndahl index values across middle super-output areas
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